IIG University of Freiburg

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Brocken Authentication and Session Management

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Sommer Semester

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Broken Authentication and Session Management

- **Account credentials and sessions tokens are often not properly protected**
  - A third can access to one's account
  - Attacker compromise password, keys or authentication token
- **Risks**
  - Undermine authorization and accountability controls
  - cause privacy violation
  - Identity Theft
- **Method of attack: use weaknesses in authentication mechanism**
  - Logout
  - Password Management
  - Timeout
  - Remember me
  - ...

Brute Force Attack (Cont.)

- **Automated process of trial and error**
  - Guess a person username and password, credit-card number, cryptographic key, ...
  - System sends a value and waits for the response, then tries another value, and so on.
- **Many systems allow the use of weak passwords**
  - An attacker will cycle through a dictionary (word by word)
  - Generates thousands (potentially millions) of incorrect guesses
  - When the guessed password is OK, attacker can access the account!
- **Same technic can be used to guess encryption keys**
  - When the size of the key is small,
  - An attacker will test all possible keys

Brute Force Attack (Cont.)

- **Normal Brute Force**
  - For one username,
  - Attacker tests many passwords

```
Username = Emmanuel
Passwords = zizou, zidane, michael-schumacher,
[pet names], [birthdays], [car names],...
```

- **Reverse Brute Force**
  - For one password,
  - Attacker tests many usernames
  - Efficient if the system has millions of users
  - The chance that many users use the same weak password dramatically increases.

```
Usernames= Emmanuel, Jan, Eric, Guenter,...
Password = 12345678
```


Session Spotting

- **Attacker has the possibility to listen to the traffic of the victim**
  - Listens to the traffic at the IP level (sniffer)
- **Client connects to the HTTP server** `www.mysite.com`
  - Visits a page containing a login form (url is HTTPS)
  - Receives a cookie containing his session ID
  - Sends his credentials encrypted (HTTPS)
- **Attacker receives following information**
  - Session ID
  - Sees that the user has sent his credentials (using an encrypted connection to the server)
- **Attacker can use the cookie to be recognized as the legitimate user!**

Replay Attack

- **Suppose the Victim wants to log on a web site**
  - Victim sends username and password
  - Web Site verifies the couple
- **If an attacker can listen to the information transfered**
  - Sniffer (unencrypted) / Trojan (encrypted) / Fishing / Man in the Middle ...
  - He can log-in the system using Username and Password
- **Solution: Use challenge response**
  - The site sends a challenge
  - The message sent by the user is a response to this challenge

Replay Attack (Cont.)

Examples of Challenge/Response systems

- **UBS (Swiss Bank) login system**
  - User receives a card and an autonomous card reader system
  - when the user wants to log in, he first need to be recognized by the card
  - Types a PIN on the card reader
  - User receives a challenge sent by UBS
  - User types the challenge in the card reader
  - The card computes a response (can be used only one time)
  - The user types the response of the system on the screen
  - User is logged in!
- **No replay Attack is possible here, since the information transferring on the network is only usable once.**

Session Fixation Attack

- **Attacker creates a session on a web site**
  - Sends a Request,
  - Get a Response containing a cookie (SESSION_ID=1234abcd5678)
  - Attacker needs to maintain this session alive (send requests regularly)
- **Attacker sends this Session ID to the victim**
  - Can be included in a phishing.
    He sends an email containing the reference to the following URL : `http://www.gmail.com/?page=...&SESSION_ID=1234abcd`.
  - Can be just a reference to an image on the targeted site:

```
<img src="http://www.gmail.com/?SESSION_ID=1234abcd">
```


Session Fixation attack (Cont.)

- **The session can be transfered using two means:**
  - URL parameter
  - Cookie
- **Targeted Web site receives the request from the victim**
  - Receives a valid SESSION_ID,
  - Resends it in the links contained in the page + as cookie
  - The page is not evaluated (browser expects an image or a javascript or a CSS or anything)
  - But the cookie is stored in the browser.
- **Next time the victim visits the target**
  - Browser sends automatically the cookie in the Request.
  - Victim logs in
- **When the attacker checks the session he/she receives the rights of the victim!**

Session Fixation Attack (Cont.)

- **Do not accept preset or invalid session identifiers**
  - It is the door for Session Fixation Attack

Session Hijacking

- **Credential/Session Prediction**
  - Attacker deduce or guess the session id
  - Attacker can use the web site with victim's privileges
- **Rights are stored in a session, only the session id is used to link the browser and its session**
  - HTTP is session-less
  - Information is not resent in each request
- **Guessing the Session ID permits to be the user**

Session Hijacking: Example



- **Many web sites generate session ID with proprietary algorithms**
  - Increment static numbers
  - Can be more complicated (factoring in time and other computer specific variables)
  - Session ID is sent to the client
- **An attack can be:**
  - Attacker connects to the web site and gets a session ID
  - Attacker calculates or Brute Forces the next session ID
  - Attacker switches the value of the cookie and assumes the identity of the next user!

Insufficient Session Expiration

- **Can be exploited on a shared computing environment**
  - More than one person has physical access to a computer
- **Suppose logout function sends the victim to site's home-page without deleting the session**
  - Or more likely, that the user just closed the window without logging-out
- **Another user could go through the browser's history and view pages accessed by the victim**
  - Since the victim's session ID has not been deleted,
  - The attacker would be able to get the privileges of the victim.

Protection



- **Authentication relies on secure communication and credential storage**
- **SSL should be the only option for all authenticated parts of the application**
  - Otherwise, listening to credential is possible
- **All credentials should be stored in hashed or encrypted form**
  - Attack on the database or file system should not compromise credentials
  - password should systematically be hashed
  - Private keys should never be stored clear text

No self-made session or SSO system



- **Only use inbuilt session management mechanism**
  - Do not write or use secondary session handlers!
- **Do not use "remember me" or home grown Single Sign On**
  - Does not apply to robust SSO or federated authentication solutions
- **Writing a robust and secure solution requires high knowledge in security**
  - Cryptography
  - Storage
  - ...

Protection (Cont.)

- **Use a single authentication mechanism**
  - With appropriate strength and number of factors
  - Ensure it is hard to spoofing and replay attacks
- **Do not make the mechanism overly complex**
  - it may become subject to an attack

Start login process from an encrypted page

- **Do not allow the login process to start from an unencrypted pages**
- **Always start login from a second page**
  - Encrypted
  - Using a fresh or new session token
- **Prevents credential or session stealing**
  - Phishing attacks
  - and Session Fixation attacks

Take Care of Logout

- **Ensure that every page has a logout link**
  - Users should not have to go to the start page to logout
- **Logout should destroy the credentials**
  - All server side session state
  - Client cookies
- **Consider Human Factor**
  - Do not ask for confirmation
  - Users will end up closing the window rather than logging out successfully
  - Give the users information about closing sessions
- **Use a timeout period**
  - Automatically logs out an inactive session

Use only strong ancillary authentication functions

- **Ancillary authentication functions ?**
  - Questions and answers for password reset
- **Example:**
  - Maiden name of the mother : can be known from social engineering
  - Date of birth : can be found
  - City of birth : can be tested using a catalog attack (try all the cities in Germany)
- **Answers should never be stored clear text**
  - Always use a one way hash function (SHA2 for instance)

No spoofable credentials as authentication

- **Do not rely on credentials that can be spoofed**
- **TCP/IP spoofing**
  - IP Addresses
  - Address range masks
  - DNS
  - or reverse DNS lookups
  - ...
- **HTTP spoofing**
  - Referrer Header

Be careful with e-mails

- **Do not send e-mails containing passwords**
  - Can be read
- **Use limited-time-only random numbers to reset access**
  - And send a follow up e-mail as soon as the password has been reset
- **Be careful of allowing users to change e-mail**
  - Send a message to the previous e-mail address before enacting the change

Conclusion

- **Attacks on Credentials are numerous**
  - Session / Username and passwords / Keys
  - From Brute Force to Session Hijacking
- **Protection may be related with risk**
  - If you are maintaining a guestbook,
  - or a bank site
  - Security can not be maintained at the same level
  - Ratios Cost/Efficiency/Usability
- **New development**
  - Use Biometrics for providing the credentials
  - Axionics Cards uses fingerprint
  - Keystroke biometrics may be used for password recovery.

References

- **OWASP Top 10 - 2007**
  `http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007`
- **A Guide for Building Secure Web Applications and Web Services**
  `http://www.lulu.com/content/1401012`
- **Web Application Security Consortium: Threat Classification** (2004)
  `http://www.webappsec.org`