The background of the slide features a large, faint watermark of the University of Freiburg seal. The seal is circular and contains a central figure, likely a saint or historical figure, surrounded by Latin text. The text "SIGILLUM UNIVERSITATIS FREIBURGENSE" is visible around the perimeter. The central figure is seated and holding a book. Below the figure are two shields with various heraldic symbols.

IIG University of Freiburg

Web Security, Summer Term 2012


Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol

Dr. E. Benoist

Sommer Semester



- Attacks using HTTP
 - Where do we Need Security?
- Symetric and Asymetric Cryptography
 - Signing a message
- Public Key Infrastructure
 - Efficiency of Cryptography
- SSL and TLS
 - Presentation of phases
 - Properties of a TLS connexion
- How to Configure your Web Server
 - Create a HTTPS server
 - Host Multiple Servers on One Machine
 - Double Side Authentication
 - Apache Configuration
- Limitations
- References



▶ HTTP is transfered Cleartext over the internet

- Request / Response sent unencrypted

▶ Eavesdropping

- Any attacker can read everything transferring on the Internet.
- Includes GET and POST parameters
- For instance Username / Password or Session Cookie

▶ Message Modification

- Message can be manipulated
- Request : add some tracking information
- Response: modify the page.

Examples:

- ▶ Add some Javascript for sending information to a third party
- ▶ Change the action of a form (to redirect the user to a phishing site)
- ▶ ...



► Confidentiality

- Nobody can read the message I send
- For both Security and Privacy

► Authentication of the partner

- Am I really talking with the server I am supposed to?
- Am I really the person I am supposed to be?

► Integrity of the Message

- Is the message the one that my partner sent?



► Symetric Cryptography

- Alice and Bob share the same Key K (which is secret)
- Alice encrypts the message with K
- Bob decrypts the message with K
- If Charly doesn't have K , he can not read the message

► Efficiency

- This type of crypto is very efficient

► Problem

- How to exchange the key if you do not meet your correspondant
- Alice and Bob need a secure chanel to exchange the key



► Knowledge of Keys is Asymmetric


- Alice wants to send a message M to Bob
- Alice has access to the public key K_{Bpub} of Bob
- Bob knows a pair (K_{Bpub}, K_{Bpriv})

► Encryption of a message

- Alice encrypts the message using Bob's Public key K_{Bpub}
- Bob decrypts the message using his private key K_{Bpriv}

► Problem

- How can Bob be sure it is Alice who sent the message?
- Charlie may have intercepted the message and replaced by another one



- ▶ **Bob wants to be certain the message was sent by Alice**
 - He wants to check the *integrity* of the message
- ▶ **Signing of the message**
 - Alice also has a pair of keys: (K_{Apub}, K_{Apriv})
 - Bob knows the public key of Alice K_{Apub}
 - Alice uses her private key to sign the message sent to Bob
 - Bob uses the public key to verify the signature of Alice
 - Since Charly does not know the private key, he can not forge such a message
 - Bob is convinced that Alice has sent this message
- ▶ **Combining both : encrypting and signing**
 - Alice writes a message M
 - She creates a signature $\sigma(M)$ with her private key K_{Apriv}
 - She encrypts both M and $\sigma(M)$ with Bob's public key K_{Bpub}
 - Bob receives the encrypted message,



► **A lot of keys have to be exchanged**



- Alice needs the public key of Bob
- Bob needs the public key of Alice
- etc.


► **How to exchange keys in a secure way?**

- Alice and Bob never met each other
- They trust the same third party (called Certificate Authority - CA)
- They both have received (in a secure way) the public key of the CA



- ▶ **Alice wants to receive Bob's public key**
 - Bob creates his key pair
 - Bob is identified by CA and gives his Name and public key to the CA
 - CA signs a "certificate" containing the following information
 - ▶ Name of the Certificate Authority
 - ▶ Name of the owner of the certificate (Bob)
 - ▶ Address, ...
 - ▶ Public key of Bob
- ▶ **So if Alice trusts the verification of CA, she trusts the public key of Bob.**
- ▶ **Problems in real life**
 - Alice and Bob may not have the same certificate authority:
We have a chain of trust (or web of trust)
 - The Public Key Infrastructure PKI uses a Root Certificate who anybody trusts.
 - You need a way to revoke compromised keys
 - ...





► Public Key Cryptography

- Very useful between unknown persons
- Requires long keys
- Is too slow
- Can not be used for big transfer

► Symetric Key Cryptography



- Reserved for people that know each other
- Can be much more efficient
- Should be used to transfer large data

► Solution

- Use the two systems
- First “Hand Shaking” using a public key
- Then (once we know each other) use a symetric key algorithm



- ▶ **TCP/IP socket can be read and modified**
 - TCP/IP does not contain any security mechanism
 - Idea: we trust the others
- ▶ **SSL and TLS**
 - Create a socket that can neither be read nor modified
 - *"Tunneling"*
- ▶ **Content is protected from its origin to its destination**
 - Content is encrypted and signed
 - Protocol prevents any modification





1. Peer negotiation for algorithm support

- For key Exchange: RSA, Difie-Hellman, DSA, SRP, PSK
- For symmetric ciphers: RC4, Triple DES, AES or Camellia
- For crypto hash function (Message authentication codes - MAC): HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA

2. Key exchange and authentication

- Exchange of Certificate(s) (normally X.509, draft for OpenPGP)
- Verification of the certificate(s) (can ask the CA if it is still valid)
- Exchange of a new secret key for symmetric encryption

3. Symmetric cipher encryption and message authentication

- Symmetric encryption is faster



► **Eavesdropping**

- The data transferred on the net are crypted. It is not possible to read it.

► **Data Modification**

- Since consistency of data is checked using MAC hash functions, content can not be modified

► **Man in the middle attack**

- The client is certain to be faced with the server possessing the certificate.



► Relies on the PKI infrastructure

- Revocation of Certificates have to be tested
- Certificate Authorities have to be known (and trusted)
- X.509 relies on a Root certificate, should not be protected

► Man in the Middle attack

- Possible: the user is warned and clicks the button *OK*

► Interception / Modification

- Much more complicated than with HTTP



- ▶ **Create a Certificate** (Standard X.509)
Contains
 - Identity and Address of the subject
 - Validity (not before, not after)
 - Public Key Information (algorithm and key)
- ▶ **Let a CA sign your certificate** You add the following information in your certificate
 - Identity and Address of the issuer of the certificate
 - Signature (algorithm and fingerprint)
- ▶ **Configure the port 443 of your server**
 - Update the configuration of your server such that it listens to this port using HTTPS.

Sample Certificate



Certificate:

Data:

Version: 1 (0x0)
Serial Number: 7829 (0x1e95)
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc,
OU=Certification Services Division,
CN=Thawte Server CA/emailAddress=server-certs@thawte.com

Validity

Not Before: Jul 9 16:04:02 1998 GMT
Not After : Jul 9 16:04:02 1999 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=Maryland, L=Pasadena, O=Brent Baccala,
OU=FreeSoft, CN=www.freesoft.org/emailAddress=baccala@freesoft.org

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)

Modulus (1024 bit):

00:b4:31:98:0a:c4:bc:62:c1:88:aa:dc:b0:c8:bb:

33:35:19:d5:0c:64:b9:3d:41:b2:96:fc:f3:31:e1:

...

d2:75:6b:c1:ea:9e:5c:5c:ea:7d:c1:a1:10:bc:b8:

e8:35:1c:9e:27:52:7e:41:8f

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

93:5f:8f:5f:c5:af:bf:0a:ab:a5:6d:fb:24:5f:b6:59:5d:9d:

92:2e:4a:1b:8b:ac:7d:99:17:5d:cd:19:f6:ad:ef:63:2f:92:

...

8f:0e:fc:ba:1f:34:e9:96:6e:6c:cf:f2:ef:9b:bf:de:b5:22:

68:9f



▶ **Virtual Hosts very common on Apache**

- One IP-address can correspond to many names (DNS's point at the same address)
- One program listens on the port 80 of the computer
- HTTP header contains a field (mandatory) Host:
- The program can create virtual hosts for each of the host names.

▶ **Problem with virtual hosts for HTTPS**

- A https server listens to the port 443
- Encrypted content arrives,
- It can not be redirected to the right server for authentication
- The requests are all directed toward one single server.

▶ **Solution: Having One IP-Address per Virtual-host**

- Virtual hosts can listen to the different ports for the different IP addresses.




► **HTTPS means : authentication of the server**

- The client verifies that the server he/she talks to is the right one
- The classic web programming is used for identification / authentication of the client: Username + password
- Why not use the same mechanism in both directions

► **Users May be authenticated by a certificate**

- The browser may send its own certificate to the server
- Certificate and Private key may be contained inside the browser, on a chip card or USB stick.



► You have to create a Certificate

- `server.crt` your certificate (signed by a CA or self-signed)
- `server.key` your private key

► Install SSL module

- Module takes care of the protocols
- Load specific configuration for the module

► Create a Virtual Host for your SSL server

- CipherSuite (which protocols are supported)
- Address of the certificate and Key
- Port (or IP-address and Port) to be listened



► **Definition of the CA's certificates (CRT)**

```
#SSLCACertificatePath /opt/lampp/etc/ssl.crt
```

```
#SSLCACertificateFile /opt/lampp/etc/ssl.crt/ca-bundle.
```

► **Definition of revocation lists (CRL) (for the CA's)**

```
#SSLCARevocationPath /opt/lampp/etc/ssl.crl
```

```
#SSLCARevocationFile /opt/lampp/etc/ssl.crl/ca-bundle.c
```

► **Set properties for clients**

- Protect one directory
- Protect the whole server
- ...



- ▶ **Private Key may be compromised** (stolen, copied, changed, ...)
 - Man in the middle attack possible
 - Revocation list

- ▶ **Content of the site may have been changed**
 - By malicious administrators
 - By visitors



- ▶ **Client may not pay attention to security warnings**
 - Manual Verification of Certificate
- ▶ **Client may be compromised**
 - Virus,
 - Trojan,
 - Worm,
 - may infect the client computer
 - Strength of the crypto depends on the client (in the handshaking part of the protocol)
- ▶ **Client may be malicious**
 - You do have 0 control on the client
 - Never trust the client side verification (javascript for instance)

- ▶ **Apache SSL/TLS Encryption**

<http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/ssl/>

- ▶ **Wikipedia**

[http:](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security)

[//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security)

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509>

- ▶ **Other resources**

[http://sebsauvage.net/comprendre/encryptage/
crypto_asy.html](http://sebsauvage.net/comprendre/encryptage/crypto_asy.html)

<http://www.openssl.org>

<http://www.authsecu.com/ssl-tls/ssl-tls.php>

<http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/presentations/pki/>