
IIG University of Freiburg

Web Security, Summer Term 2012 Injection Flows

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Sommer Semester

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Injection Flows

- **▶** Principle:
 - Occurs when user supplied data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or a query.
- ▶ Injection Flows may be done on:
 - SQL (most common)
 - LDAP
 - XPath
 - XSLT
 - HTML
 - OS Command injection
 - ...
- ► This vulnerability is very common on Web Application

- Attacker tricks the interpreter into executing unintended command
- ► Attacker supplies unexpected content to a site
 - Data is especially designed to fool the site
- Attacker may take control of the interpreter, for instance SQL:
 - Read data (unintended, of course)
 - update, delete or create any arbitrary data
- ► For the Operating System interpreter
 - Attacker may have the opportunity to execute any command

Vulnerability



- Environments affected
 - Any framework using an interpreter or invoke process
 - SQL
 - Command line
- ► System is vulnerable when user input is passed without tests


```
$query = "select_*_from_guestbook";
$query .= "_where__title_like_'".$_REQUEST['search'];
$result = mysql_query($query , $conn);
```

Java

PHP

```
String query = "select_*_from_user_where_username="";
query += req.getParameter("userID");
query += "'_and_password_=_""+req.getParameter("pwd")+""";
```

Protection



- ► Avoid the use of interpreter if possible
- Otherwise: Use safe APIs
 - Strongly typed parameterized queries
 - Object Relational Mapping (ORM)

They handle data escaping

- Validation is still recommended
 - in order to detect attacks

► Input Validation

- Validate all input data: length, type, syntax, business rules
- validation is done before displaying or storing any data
- Validation must be done server-side
- Javascript validation doesn't bring any security

► Use strongly typed parameterized query APIs

with placeholder substitution markers,

Enforce least privilege

- Configure your DB such that the web account can't do more than what is expected
- restrict the rights of your user when executing an OS command

Take Extra Care (Cont.)

- ► Avoid detailed error messages
 - Give access to versions numbers
 - Give access to parts of the code
 - Give access to configurations
- Use stored procedures
 - They are generally safe from SQL injection
 - Can however be injected (for instance using exec())
- Do not use dynamic query interfaces (such as mysql_query())

- ► Do not use simple escaping functions such as
 - addslashes() in PHP
 - str_replace("',","',")
 - it is weak and has been successfully exploited
- Prefer following methods
 - use mysql_real_escape_string()
 - or preferably PDO which does not require escaping

Language Specific recommendations //G

G natics

▶ Java EE

- use strongly typed PreparedStatement
- or use an ORM (Object Relational Manager) such as Hibernate or Spring

▶ PHP

 Use PDO with strongly typed parameterized queries (using bindParam()).

Which site is subject to SQL injection? //G

Such a site must access a DB

- The parameter should be given by the user
- This parameter is then used to select data in the DB
- Example www.mysite.com/index.php?id=100
- Means there exists a request for the page number 100

▶ If the site does not test its input

- You can test it by typing something like: www.mysite.com/index.php?id=%2710
- ▶ If the site lets the user see error messages
 - Test the output of your input

Examples

- Search form (SELECT with LIKE)
- Login form (SELECT with two =)
- Insertion of new entries
- . . .

Example: Presentation



► Suppose we have the following HTML Form

```
<form method="POST">
    <input type="text" name="username"><br>
    <input type="password" name="password"><br>
    <input type="submit" value="Login">
</form>
```

▶ and the following PHP line defining a SQL command:

```
$query = "SELECT_*_FROM_user_WHERE_username='$user'";
$query .= "_AND_password='$pwd'";
```

▶ For our examples, we disable a security feature from the php.ini file (normally this option is on, and it quotes all GET, POST and COOKIES parameters, means chars like: " and ' are escaped and become \" and \')

IIG Telematics

► Following expressions are always true

```
SELECT * FROM table WHERE 1=1;
SELECT * FROM table WHERE 1;
SELECT * FROM table WHERE ISNULL(NULL)
SELECT * FROM table WHERE 1 IS NOT NULL
SELECT * FROM table WHERE NULL IS NULL
```

➤ So we do not need a valid username and password if \$user="' OR 'a'='a" and \$password remains empty then the previous expression becomes:

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE username='' OR 'a'='a' AND \setminus password='''';
```

- Returns the list of all the users
- So we are logged in with the first provided

- We can specify the right username and change the password
 - If we give \$user="Emmanuel"
 - And \$password="' OR 'b' BETWEEN 'a' AND 'c"
- ► The previous SQL statement becomes

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE username='Emmanuel' AND \ password='' OR 'b' BETWEEN 'a' AND 'c''';
```

▶ So username is OK, but password is not checked!

Example, using Comments

- ► Another great principle in SQL injection is Comments It is also very common in all the other injections
- ▶ If we inject a #, the rest of the SQL expression is not evaluated

if \$user="John' #" the request becomes

SELECT * FROM user WHERE username='John'#' $_$ AND $_$ password='' which is equal to

SELECT * FROM user WHERE username='John'

▶ If we use the comments /* comments */ we may escape some tests

More injection in **SELECT**

Telematics displaying the

➤ Suppose we have the following query, for displaying the content of one single comment in our guestbook:

 $\verb§query = "select_*_from_guestbook_where_guestbookID = \verb§§number"$

- ▶ We can copy the content in a file
 - suppose we define \$number="11 or 1=1 INTO OUTFILE '/tmp/test.security.txt'"
 - The total content of the table is sent to a file.
- ► Suppose the Attacker has an account on the system (e.g. foobar).
 - It is possible to change the password of foobar
 - If we can write the following query:

SELECT password FROM user WHERE login='foobar' INTO OUTFILE\
'/opt/lampp/htdocs/test.php'

▶ Attacker could create any php file inside the system!!

Example: INSERT INTO

- ► Attacker can also manipulate INSERT INTO queries
 - Use the knowledge of the DB to input unsolicited data
- ► Example: Suppose we have a table user:
 - userID (auto-increment), username, password, email userlevel
- ► We have a register procedure containing following query

- ▶ Suppose we give the value \$email="','3)#"
 - Element is inserted with privilege "3" (= admin) whereas he should be only "1" (= user).

Example: UPDATE



► Suppose we have the possibility to change the password of one user

```
UPDATE 'user' SET 'password' = '$pwd1' WHERE 'userID' =\ '$uid' LIMIT 1;
```

▶ We could also change the level of the user

```
$pwd1 = "mypwd',_userlevel='3";
```

Which creates the following request:

```
UPDATE 'user' SET 'password' = 'mypwd', userlevel='3' WHERE\
'userID' = '$uid' LIMIT 1;
```

Or change the password of any other user

```
pwd1 = "mypwd' WHERE userID = 10#";
```

Which creates the following request:

UPDATE 'user' SET 'password' = 'mypwd' WHERE userID = 10

Example UPDATE (Cont.)



- ► Suppose we have a table for news. Visitors can give a note to each news.
 - We have the following table news: newsID, title, content, votes (number), score (number)
 - The following query is used to count one vote:

We have the following attack

- Why is this interesting?
 - Attacking numbers doesn't require ' or "
 - Is compatible with magic_quotes_gpc = on

Example: UNION ALL

▶ UNION ALL is used to concatenate two queries

 Written at the end of a select query, concatenates the two results

select name, price from article where price > 10 union all \setminus select username, password from user;


► Taken as one result set in programming languages

- UNION ALL is transparent for the program
- works exactly as if the select was normal
- The two selects need to have the same number of columns

► Example in the Guestbook

- Insert this instructions inside the search area
- Done in Exercise

Attacks using no quotes



- Since most of the server have magic_quotes_gpc = on
 - Attackers can not use ' or "
- Use MySQL char() function
 - Returns the character denoted by the number,
 - For instance char(104,111,112) returns the string hop
- Previous attack becomes
 - The following query is used to count one vote:

UPDATE news SET votes=votes+1, score=score+\$note WHERE\
newsID='\$id'

• We have the following attack


\$note="3,_title=char(104,111,112)

► Configure PHP such that ' and " are automatically escaped

 $magic_quotes_gpc = on$

- ► Always quote input before sending query to an interpreter
 - mysql_real_escape_string()
- Do not use any interpreter at all
 - Use PDO

Conclusion



▶ SQL Injection allows attacker to

- Read data: Access passwords, data stored
- Change Data: Access security level
- Delete data

•


► SQL injection Vulnerabilities opens the door to:

- Privacy breach : Data can be accessed without consent
- Identity theft : idem + failure in authentication
- Compromission of the system : write of new files (maybe PHP)
- ...

Easy protection are already exploited

- Adding one (or more) layers between presentation and database layer is a must (also from the point of view of Design)
- Even this has also been successfully exploited.
- Solution? test your inputs!

References



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